RALPH SIMPSON ON CRACKING THE ENIGMA 17 September 2024

Ralph Simpson was speaker of the month at the California Historical Radio Society where he gave a talk on the early development of encryption devices. He focused on the Enigma cipher machine, its inventors and patents, and its use by the German military during the Second World War. He also explains why the machine was considered unbreakable but eventually proved to be the Achilles' heel of the German armed forces during the Second World War.

Ralph had a career in the computer industry but also developed a passion for old cipher machines and their history. He is a respected member of the cryptologic history community and runs a website with a wealth of historical crypto devices and equipment for secret communications, all accompanied by technical details and relevant historical information. Be sure to visit his website Cipher History.

The history of crypto equipment is quite fascinating, but diving into the archives, searching for historical publications, or collecting those old machines is not everyone’s cup of tea. Luckily, we have a community, dedicated to preserving the history of old crypto equipment, research the technical details, publish their history and operational use, and bring those old crypto machines back to life, either physically, which can be quite expensive, or virtually through software simulations

Writing software that works exactly like the real crypto machine requires extensive study of the original machine, its mechanical and/or electrical properties, and many hours to write the software that reproduces the plaintext or ciphertext exactly like the original machine. However, you could take it one step further and make a virtual three-dimensional machine where you can manipulate all components and encrypt, decrypt or break messages, just like the wartime operators.

Martin Gillow created a website with no less than ten 3D simulations. The virtual British Colossus machine is the first ever digital computer, developed in WW2 to break the German Lorenz SZ40/42 encrypted telex, of which he also created a virtual version. There’s also the virtual Enigma machine, and the Bombe that was used by the Bletchley Park codebreakers to decrypt the German Enigma messages.

The British Typex machine and the U.S. M-209, developed by the renowned Swedish engineer Boris Hagelin, also have their 3D version. Moreover, the collection includes the ICT 1301 ”Flossie” second-generation computer, the E.R.N.I.E. electronic random number generator, and the American crib dragging machine Dragon that helped to break the Lorenz messages.

Of course, the countless hours of work by Martin to research and study those machines, and write accurate 3D versions, is just enormous, and makes this 3D collection simply unaffordable… unless you just want to preserve and share the history of old crypto machines, and make the simulations available to everyone for free. A big Thank You to Martin for creating all those virtual machines, and for being part of that small community, dedicated to preserve cryptologic history.

Make sure to scroll all the way down his main page, to find all virtual 3D simulations and read the various tutorials on how to use them. Also click the relevant "find out more" buttons to learn about each machine and its history. Visit the Virtual Colossus website.

Highly recommended, and no better day than D-day to share Martin's work and commemorate all codebreakers.

CIPHER MACHINES 3D-CT DIGITALISATION 29 January 2024

The Deutsches Museum in Munich made available a large collection of Cipher Machines 3D CT scans. The 3D-CT digitization project for historical cipher machines uses computed tomography, based on X-ray technology. This enabled the researchers to examine objects in detail, without disassembling their components and risking damage.

Visit the CT-Viewer to explore the collection of 63 different cipher machines in high resolution. Select one of the cipher machines and click the Slice View button to explore any slice of the machines. Choose a YX orientation and move the slice control to travel through the machine. Scroll the mouse to zoom in.

Select the Volume View button to explore the scans in full 3D. Hold the mouse button and move the mouse to turn the cipher machines in any direction. With the mouse wheel you zoom in and see the machines in great detail. Once you have the desired view, you can select the High Resolution option to see the tiniest details.

Slice view of the Kriegsmarine Enigma M4 © Deutsches Museum

The slice view is particularly interesting to examine the inside of components that are too fragile to disassemble. In the above scan you can explore the rotors with the scan slices coming towards you. Choose the Enigma M4 (opens in new window), select menu Slice View, orientation YZ and high resolution. Scroll the mouse to zoom in.

Use the slice text field (more accurate than the slider). Enter 345 to adjust the slice and see a rotor notch ring that carries the letters (press the enter key to validate). Enter 360 to see the internal wiring of the rotor core, 380 for the locking arcs to adjust notch ring setting, 395 for the thumb wheel and 405 for the rotor ratchet and the stepping pawl that moves the rotor. You can zoom in by scrolling the mouse. You just disassembled an Enigma rotor without touching!

Visit the Deutsches Museum 3D-Cipher page to explore all machines and learn all about the 3D scanner, the technology and how they visualize the machines and animations. You can also visit their excellent cipher machines collection.

The development of computers is closely intertwined with the history of cryptography, and vice versa. The mechanization of cryptography during the early 20th century slowly began to exceed the skills of cryptanalysts to break such encryption. The only way to break these ciphers was to also mechanize the breaking of ciphers. Colossus, the first programmable digital computer, was developed exactly for that purpose during World War II.

Until the early 1950s, computers were only used by government agencies for codebreaking, the military, weapons development and research. In 1951, the UNIVAC was the first commercially produced digital computer, but computers were mainly used by universities and large corporations like IBM and General Electric. Programming those large mainframe computers was a complex task.

Making Computers Accessible

This changed when Professors John Kemeny and Tom Kurtz from Dartmouth research university got the, I quote, crazy idea to develop a simple language to make programming easier and more accessible for non-technical undergraduate students.

However, they first had to buy a computer. Since there was no budget for computers, they bought a Librascope LGP-30 computer, an optical tape reader and a typewriter console for a total of $37,040 and booked it under furniture. That's $383,434 in present 2023.

Librascope LGP-30 with console typewriter. Source: Bob Fleischer - Wikipedia.

John Kemeny wrote the compiler to translate the new language into machine language for the LGP-30. This new language was named BASIC (Beginners' All-purpose Symbolic Instruction Code) and made programming easier than ever.

Moreover, to make BASIC accessible to as many students as possible, they implemented time sharing (sharing computing resource) on the LGP-30 computer to enable several students to independently work on their own console typewriter, remotely and simultaneously, processed on one single computer. This idea resulted in students lining up to learn programming with BASIC, the computer language that remains popular to this day.

Crypto Going Mainstream

For many people, BASIC was their first programming language when small computers became commercially available in the late 1970s. This was the era where people who bought a computer usually also learned to program. They were often called nerds, because… who on earth needs a computer? Yeah, sure.

The rapidly growing number of computers and users also spurred the development of crypto algorithms by others than government, and the few commercial firms that build crypto equipment. This fueled the everlasting competition between codemakers and codebreakers, and between state and citizens. This evolution also democratized cryptography and digital privacy. It all started when two professors decided to make programming easier. More on development of BASIC in the video below.

Birth of BASIC - Dartmouth College

More on Cryptography and Computers

More on the LGP-30 computer at the Computer Museum Stuttgart and many detailed photos at the Time-Line Computer Archive. Also read Fifty Years of BASIC on Time.

On our website you find a brief history of cryptography, and learn more about the Colossus computer, used by the British codebreaker during the Second World War to break the German Lorenz SZ40/42 machine, used for their high-level communications.

RN Communications Branch Museum/Library 06 November 2022

HMS Mercury Royal Navy Signals School

Sometimes you need a bit of serendipity to discover a fascinating website. I researched the TSEC/KL-7 cipher machine for long and was able to find many declassified documents on this 1950s cryptologic gem that served until the early 1980s. Initially named AFSAM-7, the KL-7 was developed for all US armed forces, but the US Navy developed its own fully compatible version with a few more options, named AFSAM-47B, later designated KL-47.

Unfortunately, little was known about the use of the KL-7 by the British Army, Navy and Air Force. However, several NATO documents linked Royal Navy patrol boats, minesweepers and submarines to the KL-7 instead of the naval KL-47. The search engine keywords KL-7 and Navy, and a bit of serendipity, led me to the RN Communications Branch Museum/Library.

This website is a private initiative from Ken Sutton, who served from 1966 until 1998 in the Royal Navy (RN) and retired as Warrant Officer 1st Class. He then served as civilian Communications Training Design Officer until 2012.

RN Comms Museum History

The museum/library has existed since the late 1800s when the RN Signal School was based in the RN Barracks Portsmouth, now HMS Nelson base. In 1941 the Signal School and its library moved to the HMS Mercury shore establishment near Petersfield, where the library was maintained and a small museum was established.

HMS Mercury closed in 1993 and moved into HMS Collingwood shore establishment in Fareham. Unfortunately, no space was allocated for the Mercury museum and library, leaving all exhibits kept in cupboards and drawers. The Royal Navy Signals history comprises several branches and specific expertises, of which the communicators were the workforce, and still are today.

The badges of Tactical, Women's Royal Naval Service and Telegraphist/Sparkers

The badges of Tactical, Women's Royal Naval Service and Telegraphist/Sparkers
The first badge (crossed flags) is the Tactical badge, the branch that dealt with all comms by flashing light, semaphore, flag hoists, with expertise in the maneuvering of ships. This side of the branch was transferred to the Seaman Specialist branch circa 2004.

The second badge (blue gold wings) is the Telegraphist/Sparkers badge of Women's Royal Naval Service (WRNS) Communicators from the era that WRNS served mainly in shore communications centers worldwide. Few were morse trained and most trained in message handling. They also were trained to encipher and decipher messages using various systems. Notably, they also made up the majority of GC&CS personnel in Bletchely Park during WWII. They eventually integrated in the RN and now serve aboard navy vessels, informally still known by the nickname "wrens".

The third badge (gold wings) is the Telegraphist/Sparkers badge of the branch that dealt with all radio communications. Today, this branch is referred to as the Communication and Information Systems branch (CIS) due to the amount of computerised systems used in the communications world.

Preserving History

When Ken Sutton retired in 2012, he volunteered to set it all up again. The museum is not an official RN museum, even though it resides in a naval establishment. He created the website to make the museum's exhibits and documents available to all RN Communicators past and present without having to travel long distances to visit it.

His small website turned into a major project when Jeff Dykes, a former Warrant Officer Radio Supervisor, requested Ken to incorporate his huge archive about all things Navy into the RN Comms Museum website. That's where I found the first accounts from Royal Navy personnel on the KL-7.

The website has a huge collection of technical information about naval communications, transmitters and receivers, technical drawings and photos, but also about how the Royal Navy is organized, from information on submarine warfare to burial at sea. You name it, and there's a page about it. Now, back to the KL-7.

The RN Comms Cryptography page describes in detail the KL-7 and its early use in the Royal Navy. More about the KL-7, and how it was used, at the Cold War Cryptography page. Do visit Ken Sutton's RN Communications Branch Museum/Library and make sure to check out the Sparkers and Snippets menus, each of which has several sub-menus with many more pages, hundreds! Use their Search Page to find specific items in the vast collection.

JOSEPH HELMICH AND THE KL-7 FOR CASH SPY CASE 02 August 2022

The well-known John Walker spy case from 1985 was covered extensively by the press. In 1968 he sold the technical details of the TSEC/KL-47 crypto machine (Navy version of the KL-7) to the Soviets and provided them more than 17 years the secret key sheets, causing tremendous damage to U.S. Naval communications. However, he was not the first to do so.

Joseph Helmich already compromised the KL-7 five years earlier, but his case is hardly known to the public. Both Walker and Helmich were only caught after 17 years, but textbook spy candidate Helmich could have been caught much sooner.

Career in Signals

Joseph Helmich (°1937 +2002) entered the U.S. Army in 1954. After Signal School training he served two years in Korea. In 1958 he received a Top Secret clearance at the Signal Training Center in Fort Gordon. Later that year he served at the U.S. Communications Zone Europe in Orleans, France and from 1959 until 1963 in the 275th Signal Company in Paris. Meanwhile, he was appointed Warrant Officer, now had a Top Secret clearance, and worked as custodian for classified cryptologic documents.

While in Paris, Helmich got into financial trouble and wrote some bad checks. To avoid court-martial and solve his debts he contacted the Soviet embassy and offered to sell classified information. He met with a Soviet agent, working undercover at the Soviet Trade Mission in Paris and received instructions in espionage tradecraft. He provided the Soviets with the repair manuals of the KL-7, the secret internal wiring of its rotor and the secret daily key lists.

Keys for Cash

Helmich moved in 1964 to Fort Bragg and served in a signal battalion. He made several trips to Paris to meet his handler, a GRU Soviet Military Intelligence officer. Each time, he provided copies of key lists from the KL-7, at that time the most used crypto machine by U.S. troops in Vietnam and by many of their allies. He was paid at least $131,000 but he was going to be sent to Vietnam soon.

Meanwhile, Helmich owned his own home and two jaguar cars, quite unusual for a 28-year-old of his rank. This triggered an investigation and he explained that his wealth came from an investment in France and gambling. Both claims proved unverifiable and he refused a polygraph examination. As a result, his Vietnam assignment with the Army Security Agency (ASA), a unit responsible for communications security, was turned down. Instead, he was sent to a supply unit in Vietnam.

After returning from Vietnam, his security clearance was revoked due to serious financial problems. He decided to quit the Army, rather than being discharged, and got work as a car salesman. It seemed as they would never discover his betrayal…

Connecting the Dots

In 1974 the FBI received information from a well-placed source that someone with the codename “Greenwood” worked for the GRU. The unidentified person had served in France, had experience in radio interception, served from late 1964 a year in Vietnam and then quit the Army, although still ten years to go. This was the start of FBI counterintelligence operation "Hookshot" to identify the spy. They informed U.S Army Intelligence and Security Command INSCOM to investigate who could fit that profile.

INSCOM reported that Joseph Helmich perfectly fit that profile and the FBI started an extensive investigation with surveillance, all in utmost secrecy to avoid alarming Helmich. His telephone records, jobs, earnings, and bank accounts were checked and they discovered several inconsistencies. He had earned $3,000 in three months ($18,000 in present 2022), way more than his wage as a car salesman. He was kept under surveillance for six years.

In 1980 it seemed that Helmich’s life went from poor to rich and back to poor. He now lived near Fort Gordon with its SIGINT training facility and the Charleston Navy nuclear submarine base, two sensitive locations. The FBI suspected that he might still have contact with Soviet intelligence.

New Contact and Arrest

From early on, the Soviets had deposited each of his payments in Switzerland. End of May 1980 Helmich traveled to Canada and visited the Soviet embassy in Ottawa to inquire about getting some of that money. He was told to go to Paris. The FBI, however, was on his tail and aware of the Soviet embassy visit. Helmich, at the time unemployed, returned to the United States but did not return to his home, had sold all his furniture and his home was for sale.

It was now time for the FBI to bring in Helmich and debrief him, including polygraph tests. He was interrogated extensively in the following year and was also caught trying to deceive the FBI. Helmich was arrested in July 1981 and indicted on four counts of espionage.

Two months later he eventually pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit espionage by giving the Russians a maintenance manual, technical details and key lists for the KL-7 crypto system. The government dropped three other counts under a plea agreement. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. In 2002, Joseph Helmich died in prison at the age of 65.

Clear Signs and Warnings

This was a textbook spy case that could have been avoided. People with security clearance who can't handle money are always a risk because money is an important incentive to espionage. If such a person nevertheless gets affluent, has no provable explanation, and refuses a polygraph, then all bells should ring. You can either help to solve their problems or prevent access to classified information.

It was only due to a combination of circumstances that Helmich was thoroughly investigated. The source who tipped off the FBI, the criteria only fitted Helmich, records showed both wealth and debts, and his refusal of a polygraph. FBI counterintelligence then put its teeth in the case and had the patience to wait until he made a mistake. He did and was caught. In the end, he paid dearly for having trivial financial problems and then solving them the wrong way.

Some newspapers reported that the FBI "stumbled" on Helmich when a Soviet KGB agent they were trailing met with Helmich to discuss a payment, "according to an American intelligence source". This was obviously a cover story to protect the well-placed source inside Soviet intelligence. Disclosing that information could have enabled Soviet counterintelligence to identify the mole.

Intelligence Documents

• FBI - Operation "Hookshot" Extracts identification Joseph Helmich. See also full document
• DNI - Counterintelligence on Helmich Joseph Helmich. See also CI Reference Volume 3

New York Times Press Releases

• Ex-Army Warrant Officer Accused of Being Soviet Spy
• Generals Testify in Espionage Case
• Accused Spy Halts Trial to Plead Guilty
• Life Term Imposed in Espionage Case

More on the KL-7

• TSEC/KL-7 ADONIS & POLLUX Detailed page with all technical details and the full history of the KL-7, its use by the U.S military, CIA, FBI, NATO and other allies, including many declassified documents. Also available in Dutch/Nederlands.

THE ICONIC CRYPTO AG DISAPPEARS 17 June 2021

Secret Backdoors...

The recent removal of the iconic Crypto AG logo from its building is the final milestone in the history of the once renowned firm that sold state-of-the-art crypto equipment all over the world. The iconic 1960s building, located in Steinhausen, Switzerland, is to be demolished to make room for apartments. This tale however has a stinging aftermath.

This milestone also ends the rather naive era of relying on foreign commercial firms for critical secure communications, certainly in today's digital world. The fate of Crypto AG was sealed in early 2020 when documents revealed the firm was secretly owned by the CIA and West-German federal intelligence service BND since 1970, making it the largest ever compromise of secure communications. Apart from the consequences for the customers and the firm's reputation, this was also a tragedy for the Crypto AG employees.

Take a look at the splendid photos from the abandonned Crypto AG building, taken by photographer Patrick Hürlimann. Seeing these pictures of the empty building, offices and storage rooms, you cannot but feel sad for the many employees, once buzzing around in the hallways and factory, who genuinely gave their best and took pride in developing quality equipment for the best crypto firm in the world.

Crypto AG also took good care of its well-paid employees, including many benefits. The sailboat in one of the pictures is an eerie reminder of the good times, when employees were allowed to sail the firm's boat on Zugersee, the nearby lake. Eventually, some of the firm's engineers and mathematicians became suspicious about interventions by external advisors or illogical modifications to their equipment, but they were either stonewalled by the staff or suddenly lost their job.

To leave behind a lifetime of working can be tough, certainly when they always worked with pride, but imagine seeing decades of hard work turn into an illusion of lies and spying. Not the career ending they dreamed of. But they were not the only disillusioned ones.

Unaware that Crypto AG was owned by the BND and CIA, Swedish entrepreneur Andreas Linde took over the firm and its name in 2018 and established Crypto International AG. In the wake of the revelations, with the export license suspended, Linde had no other option than to dismiss virtually all employees in mid-2020.

Earlier this year, a special prosecutor was appointed to investigate the spy scandal. In May, the Swiss intelligence chief announced he will step down end of August, following criticism about his handling of the Crypto AG case after the scandal broke out. Below the Swiss Radio & TV SRF documentary on Crypto AG (translated subtitles available)

Cryptoleaks – Wie CIA und BND weltweit spionierten (translated subtitles available)

More about Crypto AG on this Website

• History of Hagelin-Cryptos and Crypto AG on our website, also in Dutch/Nederlands.
• Crypto AG & Operation RUBICON is the full story about Operation RUBICON, the CIA and BND joint-purchase of Crypto AG at the Crypto Museum website.

MURPHY'S LAW AT THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 09 July 2020

No Such Agency

Five years ago, the National Security Agency (NSA) once again released David Boak's History of U.S. Communications Security, this time almost completely unredacted. A most interesting document with lectures about various crypto topics, but at the very end there's a chapter titled "Murphy’s Law", and it's a fun read.

Communications security encompasses extensive technical requirements and procedures that must be followed. It’s a huge challenge for NSA to draw up regulations that cover all possible safety risks. They do their best, but no matter how hard you try, there’s always Murphy's law.

Some security violations, no jokes but actual incidents, ended up in the COMSEC lectures. They even kept records of security violations, publicized them and ran contests to see what organization could go longest without violation. I won't reveal how they end, and you'll have to read it yourself, and there are more stories to discover...

They once suspected the unauthorized use of crypto materials, and a TOP SECRET key list was examined for fingerprints in their chemical lab. They placed the key list on a bench underneath a powerful ventilation system and, you guessed, the key list got sucked up and disappeared. They quickly dispatched some people to the roof to inspect the exit of the duct, but no secret key list. Flown away or stuck somewhere in the hundreds of feet of ducting?

NSA, we have a problem! A small step for man, one giant violation for COMSEC.

NSA had a warehouse in Fort Holabird where they stored a lot of crypto material. The warehouse was fenced and protected by armed guards. One evening, a man was detected inside the fence. The guard shouted “Halt!” but the man climbed over the fence and escaped. The guard could not shoot him. The reason? You won’t believe.

There’s also the story of one-time tapes, produced by NSA. These punched tapes inevitably produced huge amounts of waste product, tiny round pieces of paper. These chads were collected in burn bags. Some genius had the brilliant idea to give that confetti to high school kids for use at football games. That resulted in a school girls’ father emergency destroying and flushing TOP SECRET keys.

A technical team once had to do a sweep of a Naval Security Station to trace suspected wiring. The inspector opened a floor access plate to examine telephone wiring. He saw a wire that was moving, so he quickly grabbed the wire and pulled it out a few feet, but then the wire began to fight back. What the hell was going on? Want to know how the incidents ended?

These and other Murphy stories at History of U.S. COMSEC Volume I and II, starting at pdf page 313 (document page 55) , hosted on Governmentattic.org, which also has also a lot of interesting crypto related information.

If you're in for more fun with crypto, do visit Jerry Proc's Crypto Humour page. with real stories from the fringes of communications security. Jerry hosts the excellent Crypto Machines website with extensive information about numerous crypto devices.

OPERATION VULA'S SECURE COMMUNICATIONS 14 November 2016

Operation Vula was the creation of an underground ANC leadership with supporting secure communications network in South Africa to fight against the apartheid regime. The operation ran from 1988 to 1991 and is also the fascinating story of Tim Jenkin, who played a key role in providing secure communications.

Going Underground

Tim Jenkin today

Tim Jenkin came into contact with the anti-apartheid movement when he visited the African National Congress (ANC) office in London. He was eager to support the fight against apartheid. Jenkin was trained in covert operations and returned to South Africa where he and his good friend Stephen Lee started underground work for ANC in 1975.

They ran a propaganda shop but got arrested in 1978 and were sentenced to respectively 12 and 8 years imprisonment. Amazingly, they escaped 18 months later from a Pretoria high security prison with keys that Jenkin made out of wood. This gives you an idea of how creative he was. Jenkin left South Africa and made his way to the ANC office in London where he became a trainer for underground operatives.

ANC Going Blind in Exile

The ANC leadership had fled to Lusaka in Zambia after many of their leaders and members were jailed or tortured. This left the ANC with no representatives in South Africa. Among the exiled members were ANC president Oliver Tambo, commander of the military wing (MK) Siphiwe Nyanda and ANC strategist Mac Maharaj, whose mission was to revive the freedom movement and ignite revolution in South Africa.

This proved to be a mission impossible because of the problems to communicate and coordinate with the few ANC members that were still in South Africa. In the mid 1980s, communications between London, Lusaka and operatives in South Africa were still protected by manual one-time pad encryption that was too cumbersome for long reports that took many hours up to days to encrypt by hand.

Oliver Tambo tasked Siphiwe Nyanda to join MK's Chief of Staff Joe Slovo in starting up Operation Vula. The goal of this extensive operation was to set up a secure covert communications network and to smuggle ANC leaders and weapons into South Africa to install a leadership that would take over command of the underground work. This is where Tim Jenkin comes into play.

Jenkin met Mac Haharaj while training ANC agents on radio communications in Lusaka. Haharaj asked him to set up secure communications between covert operatives in South Africa and the ANC office in London. At that time, Jenkin was experimenting with computer communications.

Establishing Secure Communications

Personal computers were quite a novelty in the 1980s but handyman Jenkin developed one-time pad encryption software that used floppy disks, filled with random data, to serve as key. During encryption, used key bytes were automatically wiped from the disk, making the system unbreakable. The software also increased encryption speed for Vula messages considerably, compared to the slow pen-and-paper system.

Jenkin's office in London, nicknamed GCHQ (after the British Signals Intelligence organization) served as the main Vula communications hub for messages between London, Lusaka and South Africa. In his computer shack he developed, tested and ran secure communications to cope with the increasing number of reports from and to the ANC underground leadership.

Tim Jenkin in his communications hub

Jenkin devised a system to convert encrypted message digits into DTMF (dual-tone multi-frequency) telephone dial tones that were then recorded onto cassette tapes for transmission by pay phone later one. They provided ANC operatives with several DTMF tone generators that were disguised as electronic calculators. Later on, they dropped the method of manually keying in the DTMF tones and drastically increased communication speed by recording the computer modem sound directly to tape.

Setting Up the Network

Conny Braam, a Dutch anti-apartheid activist, became responsible for the Vula logistics. She ran a network of people that supported the entire operation. First task was to get the network running. She had to find someone to travel several times a month between Amsterdam and Johannesburg. Air hostess Antoinette Vogelsang volunteered as courier. Being an air hostess, she didn't have to go through airport checks and could safely smuggle into South Africa the Toshiba laptops and software that secured the network. She also provided the communication hubs with a regular supply of floppy disks, containing new one-time pad keys.

The Dutch Lucia Raadschelders was sent to Lusaka to run a communications hub from a small house in the slums. She also served as contact between Jenkin and ANC headquarters in Lusaka. Janet Love, the ANC underground operative in Johannesburg switched from the slow manual one-time pad encryption to its fast computerized version. Everything was finally up and running. In 1988, Mac Maharaj and Siphiwe Nyanda were the first Vula leaders to clandestinely infiltrated into South Africa.

Meanwhile, Janet Love's communications hub in Johannesburg was also operational. Tim Jenkin received the first long reports from Mac Maharaj a few weeks later. ANC's freedom movement finally was able to communicate securely with Jenkin's London office as central hub. From then on, Janet Love encrypted all Johannesburg messages and recorded the computer modem sound on cassette tape.

From South Africa over London to Mandela

The operative in South Africa chose a random pay phone to call an answering machine in London and played back the tape with the message that he had encrypted and recorded earlier. The London office checked the message and called the operative's pager with a specific code to signal that the message had arrived well. London then relayed this message to, for instance, ANC headquarters in Lusaka.

The London office also used a specific pager code to warn operatives in South Africa that there were messages for them to receive. To retrieve a message, the operative again chose a random pay phone and called another answering machine in London on which the London HQ had recorded an encrypted message from Lusaka or from other operatives.

From the manual encryption of long reports, taking many hours to encrypt and days to get across, they now were able to get a message to London in one or two hours. Jenkin relayed the messages almost real-time back and forth between the ANC headquarter in Lusaka and the operatives in South Africa. The South African security services could not track these messages as they were sent anonymously from randomly chosen pay phones. It would require them to monitor each and every pay phone and even if they managed to intercept such a message, it would merely contain what seemed like unintelligible fax or computer tones, giving them no clue about their purpose.

Mac Maharaj succeeded in setting up covert communications with the imprisoned Nelson Mandela through his lawyers. By then, the South African government held secret talks with Mandela, who they believed to be clueless about the situation in the country. Little did they know that Mandela was in direct contact with ANC president Oliver Tambo and a well organized underground leadership. In fact, without realizing it, the apartheid regime was negotiating directly with the ANC. When Nelson Mandela was released from prison in February 1990, the Vula operation continued underground to protect the actual leadership and its communications with Mandela.

Caught But Mission Accomplished

The operation was eventually compromised in July 1990 after the police followed Siphiwe Nyanda and discovered encryption disks and plain messages in a Vula hide-out. Mac Maharaj, Siphiwe Nyanda and six other Vula members were arrested and imprisoned. Others fled the country or went into hiding. Despite this setback, Tim Jenkin was able to reboot the Vula network within 24 hours. All Vula members eventually received amnesty as part of the political transition that led to the end of apartheid.

Tim Jenkin's story is an amazing example of people with no background in intelligence, espionage tradecraft or secure communications who used their creativity to set up an ingenious international secure network that changed South Africa's history. It should be noted that their communications system, which was quite novel and therefore secure in the 1980s, would pose serious risks in today's world with advanced signals intelligence capabilities, ranging from hacking computers to extensive electronic surveillance and geolocation.

Tim Jenkin's story of operation Vula is published at the Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory. More about the encryption systems and equipment at How the ANC sent encrypted messages. Below the excellent eNCA documentary about operation Vula and a NGC documentary of Tim Jenkin's escape from Pretoria prison.

TATJANA J. VAN VARK AT SECRET COMMUNICATIONS 2 13 November 2016

The Crypto Museum and the Foundation for German Communication and Related Technologies again teamed up to present their second Secret Communications exhibit. This unique and meanwhile international event brings together the finest pieces of historical crypto and covert radio equipment, some of which has never been on public display before (non-exhaustive list here). I visited the opening day, but the collection can be visited two three (!) more days in the coming weeks. Due to its immense success, there will be an additional exhibit on January 14.

This year, we have the honor of receiving Tatjana Joëlle van Vark, a Dutch lady who is impossible to introduce in a few words. On November 12 she gave a demonstration of her amazing, hand-crafted Cryptograph machine and we were fortunate to talk with her. She will give a second demonstration on December 3.

Although inspired by the German Enigma Machine, the Cryptograph is quite different and more complex in mechanical design. Her machine includes encryption of letters, digits and punctuations, a printer and paper tape puncher and reader.

Tatjana explains the mechanics of the Cryptograph

Some call it a Super Enigma, but I prefer to see it more as a piece of artwork. Tatjana is a lady who strives for perfection and beauty. The sophistication and attention to detail are a crucial part of all her projects and the hallmark of her work and philosophy. From the tiniest metal parts, over tidy packed wiring to the shiny instrument panels, it all breathes perfection.

The Cryptograph. An artwork of electro-mechanical design and beauty

Personally, I believe that somewhere along the road we lost the desire to create beauty in everyday items. Everyone knows those old radios, from little design pieces to beautiful wood crafted receivers, but also the gracious curves of kitchen machines and other household items, all produced with excellent and durable materials. This craftsmanship and design has almost become a lost art. Sadly, today's products in simple plastic boxes are often a hymn to cheap mass production.

not so with Tatjana J. van Vark! Her projects arise from her imagination and are shaped and developed solely in her mind. She doesn't use technical drawings or plans and works straight from her memory! She has what we can call a beautiful mind, supplemented with skilled hands that put raw materials into all kinds of precision parts, assembled into devices that are no longer simply functional objects but true pieces of art. The true art of creating things.

The Cryptograph printer. Perfection as only to be found in scientific instruments

Talking about Enigma, Tatjana is above all an enigmatic person. Her interest in scientific instruments as a child evolved into scientific work for technology firms, government and military. Her work includes such a wide range of science and technology that can only be explained by her drive to understand and learn all and everything. Power systems, electronics, telephone switching, instruments for the pharmacy industry, aircraft avionics, radar and weapons control, navigational equipment, optics. You name it, she did it.

She explained to me that you can create anything, as long as you learn enough and think enough about it. Now that's the spirit of a true explorer. I can only end with admitting being really jealous of that lady's talents.

Much more to discover at Secret Communications 2

You will have another chance to meet Tatjana J. van Vark and her Cryptograph on the last day of the Secret Communications exhibition on December 3. More info about the unique Secret Communications 2 exhibition, its amazing list of displayed items and directions to its location near Amsterdam in the Netherlands at this link. Be advised that roadworks are in progress near the exhibition and alternative directions are available.

If you can't make it to the exhibition, then you should visit Tatjana J. van Vark's website and her amazing collection of home brew instruments with many amazing photos (make sure to click each image for more details) or visit her page at the Craftsmanshipmuseum. Below a short documentary (subtitles included) showing some of Tatjana Joëlle van Vark's extraordinary work.